National Backdrop

The Conservatives had heavily lost the general election on July 24, and the new Labour government quickly made itself very unpopular with broken promises and the removal of pensioners’ winter fuel allowance, among other measures.

Therefore, both parties were discredited in the eyes of voters, which enabled Reform UK to capitalise on the dissatisfaction with national parties without offering alternative policies.

The conservatives, nationally, were at about 23% in the polls, which was half the figure from 2021. Reform was over 30%.

The Lincolnshire Conservatives had a group fighting fund, which was utilised to produce postal vote recruitment letters, Facebook advertising, and a late postcard to pro-conservative households (non-PV) delivered by Royal Mail.

Candidates were encouraged to engage in campaign activities well before the campaign (limited take-up); about 30 used the postal vote recruitment letter in February.

Nearly all candidates distributed election address leaflets during the campaign, mostly using the central template, and most also delivered letters directly to postal voters. Some also did a last-minute card to probable supporters.

More candidates used VoteSource to gather canvassing data and used it to target their campaigns. Some candidates engaged in door-knocking to varying degrees.

The campaign was going well under the circumstances, with a polite reception, and the candidates worked very hard, an improvement from last time. There was an excellent team spirit, and we were hopeful of retaining council control with 35+ seats, having started with 54. Our campaign was based on delivering exemplary service and mitigating the risks associated with alternatives.

Outside of Lincoln, opposing candidates did little physical campaigning, although RUK spent heavily on Royal Mail deliveries (exceeding spending limits in many areas) and had an effective online campaign based on Britain’s broken, anti-immigration, and perceived council waste and borrowing issues. They also targeted postal voters.

In the event, RUK swept to power with 44 seats from nil; Conservatives went from 54 to 14, Labour 4 to 3, LD 3 to 5, and Ind 3. Turnout was slightly lower than in 2021.

In retrospect, there was a public mood swing against Labour and Conservatives, and many of their supporters chose Reform determinedly as a protest against immigration and the feeling that the country is in a mess, also sending “them “a message. Service delivery and good local performance by sitting councillors were largely discounted.

The result was mirrored across other Councils with elections and, in hindsight, was inevitable due to the failures of national parties.

Lessons

You can’t buck a national trend & local elections are inexorably tied to national voting trends.

Although candidates generally worked hard, relying solely on leaflet delivery and social media is insufficient in a political headwind; face-to-face, targeted door-to-door knocking is essential. The evidence is clear that cavassing is king and those candidaes who knocked on a lot of doors did better than those who ran more traditional campaigns.

Campaigns need to start earlier; in particular, sitting councillors must establish a favourable local profile, which remains the most effective way of insulating themselves against defeat.